Developments in the Economics of Aging by James J. Choi et al.
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Developments in the Economics of Aging  
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-90335-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise09-1
Conference Date: May 2005
Publication Date: March 2009
Chapter Title:  Reducing the Complexity Costs of 401(k) Participation 
through Quick Enrollment
Chapter Authors:  James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian 
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11310
Chapter pages in book: (57 - 82)57
Previous research has shown that 401(k) participation increases dramati-
cally when companies switch from an opt-in to an opt-out (or automatic)
enrollment regime (Madrian and Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2004; Choi et al.
2006). Although automatic enrollment has been widely touted as an eﬀec-
tive tool for encouraging saving, it has its detractors. Some libertarians
dislike automatic enrollment because they view it as coercing individuals
into the company-chosen default contribution rate and asset allocation.In-
deed, the vast majority of automatically enrolled employees passively ac-
cept all of the defaults in the short run, and many remain at those defaults
for years (Choi et al. 2004; Choi et al. 2006). Paternalists, in contrast, like
the fact that automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation but ob-
ject to companies choosing default contribution rates that they perceive as
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acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Sloan Foundation.too low and asset allocations that are too conservative.1 Firms, however,
have been reluctant to adopt more aggressive defaults for fear of partici-
pant lawsuits should the default investments decline in value.
One reason that automatic enrollment increases 401(k) participation is
that it reduces the complexity of the decision-making task. Rather than
evaluating all possible contribution rate and asset allocation options, em-
ployees need only compare the automatic enrollment default with nonpar-
ticipation. Relative to plans with automatic enrollment, opt-in plans im-
pose a much greater decision-making burden on enrollees. But a high level
of complexity in an opt-in plan is not necessary. There are ways to reduce
complexity that are not as extreme as adopting automatic enrollment.
In this chapter, we analyze one such alternative, called Quick Enroll-
ment, developed by Hewitt Associates.2Quick Enrollment gives employees
the option of enrolling in the savings plan by opting into a default contri-
bution rate and asset allocation preselected by the employer. If Quick En-
rollment succeeds in reducing complexity by allowing employees to focus
on evaluating a smaller subset of options (e.g., nonenrollment and the de-
fault), savings plan participation should increase relative to a standard
opt-in enrollment regime. The fact that all Quick Enrollment elections are
aﬃrmative also addresses both the libertarian and paternalist objections to
automatic enrollment. For libertarians, there is no coercion into the de-
fault. For paternalists, aﬃrmative elections reduce the legal risks from
choosing a less conservative default asset allocation. The implementations
studied in this chapter may also motivate increased 401(k) participation by
giving employees a deadline for using Quick Enrollment to join the 401(k)
plan, akin to the “active decision” approach to 401(k) enrollment analyzed
in Choi et al. (2005).
We evaluate three diﬀerent implementations of Quick Enrollment at two
ﬁrms. Two of the implementations were short-term interventions that tar-
geted nonparticipating employees who had previously been hired by the
ﬁrms we study. The third was an ongoing intervention for newly hired
employees. For all three implementations, we ﬁnd that Quick Enrollment
resulted in substantial 401(k) participation increases, although these in-
creases are not nearly as large as those obtained through automatic en-
rollment in other ﬁrms. We also document the importance of the Quick
Enrollment default for contribution rate and asset allocation outcomes.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 describes the implementa-
tion of Quick Enrollment at the two ﬁrms we study and the data that we use
to analyze its eﬀect. Section 2.2 presents the results of our empirical anal-
ysis at the ﬁrst company. Section 2.3 presents the results of our empirical
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1. See Hewitt (2005), Proﬁt Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2001), and Vanguard
(2001) for a description of the empirical distribution of automatic enrollment defaults.
2. Hewitt Associates provided the data analyzed in this paper.analysis at the second company. We conclude in section 2.4 by comparing
Quick Enrollment with other mechanisms for inﬂuencing 401(k) savings
outcomes.
2.1 Quick Enrollment Implementation at Two Firms
The ﬁrst Quick Enrollment implementation we study was at a large
health services company—hereafter referred to as Company A—with ap-
proximately 40,000 employees at more than twenty locations. Table 2.1
gives demographic characteristics for the active employees at this ﬁrm on
December 31, 2003, along with characteristics of all private sector em-
ployees in the March 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS) as a basis for
comparison. Relative to the U.S. population, Company A workers are
slightly older, earn a little more, and are much more likely to be female.
Table 2.2 presents features of the 401(k) plan at Company A. Virtually
all Company A employees in our data are immediately eligible for the
401(k) plan. At most locations, employees who are at least twenty-one
years old and have attained 1,000 hours of service are eligible for a 50 per-
cent matching contribution from the company on the ﬁrst 4 percent or 6
percent of pay contributed to the plan. Employees may contribute up to
100 percent of their pay (provided their contributions do not exceed the
IRS dollar contribution limits) to eleven diﬀerent investment options.
There is no employer stock in the fund menu.
Figure 2.1shows the Quick Enrollment timeline at Company A. Prior to
July 2003, the company used a standard opt-in enrollment process: employ-
ees were not enrolled in the 401(k) plan unless they made an aﬃrmative
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Table 2.1  Employee characteristics
Company A  Company B  Private sector 
active employees  active employees  employees 
on Dec. 31, 2003 on Dec. 31, 2003 March 2003 CPS
Average age (years) 41.9 45.3 39.0
Percent male 26.5 76.2 53.4
Compensation
Avg. annual income $38,321 $36,782
Median annual income $28,523 $27,000
Ethnic composition
White (%) 84.3 83.1
Black (%) 12.7 10.5
Other (%) 3.0 6.3
Number of employees ~40,000 ~20,000
Source:Authors’ calculations. Information on ethnicity and income is not available for Com-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Aelection through a toll-free phone call to the ﬁrm’s beneﬁts administrator
or through visiting the beneﬁts administration Web site. Changes in the
401(k) participation, contribution rate, and investment allocation could be
made at any time.
In July 2003, Company A adopted Quick Enrollment on a trial basis at
its main location. New employees attending orientation were given Quick
Enrollment cards that gave them the choice of checking a box to initiate
401(k) participation at a contribution rate of 2 percent of salary (before
tax) and a preselected asset allocation (50 percent in a money market fund
and 50 percent in a balanced fund). Returning the Quick Enrollment card
was not mandatory and was not described to employees as mandatory.
However, the cards did note a deadline of two weeks after orientation for
submitting the card if the employees wished to use the Quick Enrollment
process (the deadline on the card was a speciﬁc date that changed accord-
ing to when the new-employee orientation was held).3
From July through September, the Quick Enrollment form gave em-
ployees two options: “Yes! I want to enroll . . . and begin saving in the
[Company A] Savings Plan,” and “No. I don’t want to enroll at this time.”
From October to December, the “No” option was eliminated from the
Quick Enrollment form to investigate whether making nonparticipation
salient through the “No” option aﬀected enrollment. Failure to return ei-
ther version of the form was treated as a negative 401(k) participation elec-
tion. Employees also had the option to initiate participation on their own
at any contribution rate and with any investment allocation through the
standard channels (phone or Internet) throughout this time. In February
2004, Company A adopted Quick Enrollment as a permanent feature of its
new employee orientation, with continued use of the yes-only form.
The second Quick Enrollment implementation took place at Company
A from mid-June through early fall 2004 for nonparticipating employees
who were already at the ﬁrm. This implementation occurred in conjunc-
tion with the adoption of a new Web-based beneﬁts management system
for all employees. As part of the transition to this new system, the company
had employees meet individually with representatives of an outside vendor
to help them register on the new system. These meetings were not designed
to be individual ﬁnancial planning sessions, but representatives answered
questions about company beneﬁts—in particular, the ﬁrm’s life insurance
products and savings plan. Nonparticipating employees were given the op-
portunity to enroll in the 401(k) plan using a Web-based Quick Enrollment
interface. This implementation oﬀered the same asset allocation as the new
hire implementation, but employees could choose any pretax contribution
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3. The company reports that many of the Quick Enrollment cards were handed in during
the orientation rather than taken home and mailed in. The deadline was not actually binding,
although employees probably did not know this.rate. Employees did not have the option to use the Web-based Quick En-
rollment option after the meeting.
The third Quick Enrollment implementation that we study is at Com-
pany B, a ﬁrm in the manufacturing industry. This company employs ap-
proximately 20,000 individuals. Table 2.1 gives demographic characteris-
tics for the active employees at this ﬁrm on December 31, 2003. Company
B employees are signiﬁcantly older than the U.S. average and much more
likely to be male. Other demographic data (e.g., race/ethnicity and pay) are
not available for this company.
Table 2.2 describes the 401(k) plan features at Company B. Employees
are immediately eligible for the 401(k) plan, which provides a variable
matching contribution between 55 percent and 125 percent, depending on
company proﬁtability, on the ﬁrst 6 percent of pay contributed to the plan.
The employer match is invested in employer stock. Employees may con-
tribute up to 25 percent of pay (subject to the IRS dollar contribution lim-
its) and choose among nine investment options, including employer stock.
Quick Enrollment at Company B was implemented as a one-time mail-
ing to nonparticipating employees already at the ﬁrm in the latter half of
January 2003. Employees were given the option to check a box to enroll in
the 401(k) plan at a 3 percent (before-tax) contribution rate invested en-
tirely in a money market fund. Figure 2.2 shows the Quick Enrollment
timeline at Company B. Although employees at Company B were given a
two-week deadline for returning the Quick Enrollment cards, this deadline
was not binding in practice. Cards returned after the deadline were held
and processed in May 2003.
The data we use to analyze Quick Enrollment at these two ﬁrms come
from Hewitt Associates, a large beneﬁts administration and consulting
ﬁrm. The data are a series of year-end cross-sections of all employees at
Companies A and B. For Company A, we have cross-sections from year-
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Fig. 2.2 Timeline of enrollment mechanisms at Company Bend 2002, year-end 2003, and September 1, 2004. For Company B, we have
cross-sections from year-ends 2002 and 2003. These cross-sections contain
demographic information such as birth date, hire date, gender, state of res-
idence, and compensation.4 They also contain point-in-time information
on 401(k) savings outcomes, including participation status in the plan, date
of ﬁrst participation, the contribution rate, asset allocation, and total bal-
ances. In addition, we have ethnicity data for Company A employees active
at year-end 2003 and September 1, 2004.
2.2 Quick Enrollment and 401(k) Outcomes at Company A
In designing the Quick Enrollment implementation at Company A, our
initial intent was to compare participation under three enrollment mecha-
nisms: the yes/no Quick Enrollment card, the yes-only Quick Enrollment
card, and the standard opt-in enrollment protocol without Quick Enroll-
ment. The empirical methodology to do this would have been straightfor-
ward: we would have three diﬀerent treatment regimes and treated and un-
treated locations (the main location versus everywhere else). The untreated
locations would allow us to control for time eﬀects that might otherwise
confound comparisons of the diﬀerent enrollment regimes at the treated
location.
Our ability to carry out this methodology in a completely convincing
fashion has been limited by three factors. First, although Quick Enroll-
ment forms were only distributed at the main location’s orientation ses-
sions, employees do not necessarily attend orientation at the location
where they work. Therefore, a nontrivial number of employees at the un-
treated locations actually had the opportunity to use Quick Enrollment.
This contamination of the control locations will cause a comparison of the
main location against other locations to underestimate the Quick Enroll-
ment eﬀect. Second, after seeing Quick Enrollment’s success at the new-
employee orientations from July to September 2003, the beneﬁts oﬃce de-
cided to distribute Quick Enrollment forms at the ﬁrm’s annual beneﬁts
fairs in October and November 2003. These beneﬁts fairs were held at
many locations, providing additional exposure to Quick Enrollment for
employees at locations that would otherwise serve as controls. Third, the
coincident timing of the beneﬁts fairs with the yes-only Quick Enrollment
form precludes a clean comparison of the yes-no and yes-only forms, since
new employees also potentially attended the beneﬁts fairs.
However, the permanent adoption of the yes-only Quick Enrollment
form in February 2004 at the main location orientation sessions allows us
to compare 401(k) outcomes at the main location from February 2004 on-
ward to outcomes at the main location prior to Quick Enrollment’s initial
implementation in July 2003.
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4. Compensation data are not available for Company B.Recall that the ﬁrm oﬀered Quick Enrollment in a diﬀerent fashion to
nonparticipating employees from June to August 2004 in conjunction with
its Web-based beneﬁts management program rollout. Because of this, we
restrict our initial Quick Enrollment analysis to employees hired from Feb-
ruary to May 2004, and we do not examine these employees’ 401(k) out-
comes beyond mid-June 2004. We use as our control group employees
hired from February to May 2003 and February to May 2002. Table 2.3
shows that the demographic characteristics of employees at the company’s
main location who were hired from February to May of 2002, 2003, and
2004 appear very similar.
Figure 2.3 plots the 401(k) participation rate against tenure for employ-
ees hired at the company’s main location before and after Quick Enroll-
ment. For employees hired from February to May of 2002 and 2003, the
401(k) participation paths track each other quite closely, suggesting no
dramatic changes in employee characteristics or other factors inﬂuencing
401(k) participation. The participation rates for newly hired employees are
extremely low: about 5 percent after the ﬁrst month of employment and 15
percent after twelve months. The participation rates under Quick Enroll-
ment are dramatically higher: 19 percent after the ﬁrst month of employ-
ment and 35 percent in the third month. We do not calculate Quick En-
rollment participation rates at higher tenure levels because they would be
potentially contaminated by the June-to-August intervention described
previously.
Figure 2.4 shows the one-month and three-month participation rates at
the company’s main location by hire month. Although there is some par-
ticipation rate variability across hire months both before and after Quick
Enrollment, this variation is dwarfed by the large participation increases
generated by Quick Enrollment.
To control for potential diﬀerences in the demographic composition of
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Table 2.3  Employee characteristics by hire cohort: Company A (main location)
Feb.–May 2002  Feb.–May 2003  Feb.–May 2004 
cohort in  cohort in  cohort in 
June 2002 June 2003 June 2004
Average age (years) 31.4 32.0 32.7
Percent male 27.6 28.6 28.9
Compensation
Avg. annual income ($) 19,510 20,928 22,918
Median annual income ($) 16,619 17,282 17,581
Ethnic composition
White (%) 77.1 79.1 75.6
Black (%) 20.6 17.9 21.6
Other (%) 2.3 3.0 2.8
Number of employees 455 407 733
Source: Authors’ calculations.employees hired before and after Quick Enrollment, we run probit regres-
sions of one-month and three-month participation in the 401(k) plan on
age, gender, race, compensation, and a Quick Enrollment dummy, which
is set to 1 for employees hired from February to May 2004. The sample in
these regressions is employees hired from February to May of 2002, 2003,
and 2004, with the employees hired in 2002 and 2003 serving as a pre-
Quick Enrollment control group.5The ﬁrst two columns of table 2.4list the
marginal eﬀects at the sample means from the probit regressions for em-
ployees at the ﬁrm’s main location where Quick Enrollment was used. The
only statistically signiﬁcant demographic characteristics are compensation
and age: higher-paid and older employees are much more likely to enroll.
The Quick Enrollment eﬀect is large and statistically signiﬁcant, increas-
ing the one-month participation rate by fourteen percentage points and the
three-month participation rate by sixteen percentage points. This repre-
sents a tripling of the one- and three-month participation rates prior to
Quick Enrollment.6
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Fig. 2.3 401(k) participation by tenure (Company A, main location)
5. In the three-month participation regressions, the sample is restricted to employees hired
during February and March, since we do not observe three-month participation rates for em-
ployees hired in April and May of 2004 prior to the individual meetings that started in June
2004. For the sake of comparability, we also restrict the sample of employees hired in 2002 and
2003 to those hired in February and March. The results are qualitatively similar when em-
ployees hired in April and May of 2002 and 2003 are not excluded from the three-month par-
ticipation regressions.
6. Ordinary least square (OLS) results, while not reported, yield qualitatively similar esti-
mates.Because Quick Enrollment was only distributed at the main location ori-
entations, a useful speciﬁcation check is to see whether there is a Quick En-
rollment eﬀect at other locations. The last two columns of table 2.4 present
regression results for employees working at other locations. The Quick En-
rollment coeﬃcients are small in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant.
These results suggest that the estimated Quick Enrollment eﬀect at the
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A
B
Fig. 2.4 A: 401(k) participation one month after hire, by hire month (Company A,
main location); B: 401(k) participation three months after hire, by hire month
(Company A, main location)
Note: 2004 three-month participation rates for April and May hires are not reported due to
potential contamination with the June to August 2004 Quick Enrollment intervention for all
employees.main location is indeed caused by Quick Enrollment and not spurious cor-
relation with other factors.
Table 2.5 examines which employees are most aﬀected by Quick Enroll-
ment. In the ﬁrst two columns, we break down the one-month participa-
tion rate by various demographic characteristics for employees hired prior
to Quick Enrollment (February to May of 2002 and 2003) and after Quick
Enrollment (February to May 2004).7 The last two columns of table 2.5
divide the post-Quick Enrollment participants into two subgroups: those
who enrolled using a non-Quick Enrollment channel, and those who en-
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Table 2.4  Probit regressions of 401(k) enrollment at Company A: new hires
Main location Other locations
Enrolled in  Enrolled in  Enrolled in  Enrolled in 
1 month 3 months 1 month 3 months
Age (years) 0.0013∗ 0.0031∗ –0.0003 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Female 0.0034 0.0191 0.0436∗ 0.0109
(0.0147) (0.0300) (0.0152) (0.0320)
Black 0.0048 –0.0544 –0.0241 –0.0525
(0.0178) (0.0329) (0.0211) (0.0305)
Other/unknown race –0.0118 –0.0137 —a —a
(0.0367) (0.0721)
Pay ($1000’s) 0.0031∗∗ 0.0036∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0032∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Quick Enrollment cohort 0.1398∗∗ 0.1630∗∗ 0.0265 –0.0192
(0.0174) (0.0367) (0.0189) (0.0286)
Sample size N   1613 N   610 N   776 N   307
Pseudo R2 0.1667 0.1468 0.1515 0.1787
Source:Authors’ calculations. The table reports marginal eﬀects at sample means from a pro-
bit regression where the dependent variable is whether the employee has enrolled in the 401(k)
either one or three months after hire. The sample in the one-month regressions is employees
hired from February to May of 2002, 2003, and 2004. The sample in the three-month regres-
sions is employees hired in February and March of 2002, 2003, and 2004. Female, Black, and
Other/unknown race are dummy variables. Quick Enrollment cohort is a dummy for em-
ployees hired from February to May 2004 in the one-month regression and in February and
March 2004 in the three-month regression. Standard errors are in parentheses under the point
estimates.
aNone of the sample of other/unknown race enrolled within three months of hire. Conse-
quently, all of these employees as well as the Other/unknown race variable were dropped from
this regression.
∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
∗∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
7. The results in table 2.5 are qualitatively similar for three-month rather than one-month
enrollment rates. We report one-month enrollment rates in table 2.5 because the sample sizes
for some of the demographic subgroups are quite small if three-month enrollment rates are
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Table 2.5  Enrollment rates by employee characteristics: new hires at Company A’s





Fraction Fraction  enrolling at  enrolling at QE 
enrolling at any  enrolling at any  nondefault  default 
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Age
  30 (%) 4.4 12.2 3.4 8.8
(528) (319) (319) (319)
30–50 (%) 7.4 29.3 7.7 21.6
(394) (222) (222) (222)
  50 (%) 8.1 26.5 6.3 20.3
(86) (64) (64) (64)
Gender
Female (%) 5.9 18.5 4.5 14.1
(716) (426) (426) (426)
Male (%) 5.8 23.5 7.3 16.2
(292) (179) (179) (179)
Race/Ethnicity
Black (%) 3.9 18.0 3.0 15.0
(205) (133) (133) (133)
White (%) 6.1 21.4 6.2 15.2
(776) (454) (454) (454)
Other/unknown (%) 14.8 0 0 0
(27) (18) (18) (18)
Compensation
  $25K (%) 2.7 13.0 2.4 10.7
(734) (460) (460) (460)
$25K–$50K (%) 10.0 35.5 11.2 24.3
(211) (107) (107) (107)
 $50K (%) 28.6 60.5 23.6 36.8
(63) (38) (38) (38)
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample in column 1 is employees hired from February to
May of 2002 and 2003. The sample in the remaining columns is employees hired from Febru-
ary to May of 2004. Sample sizes for each cell reported in parentheses.
rolled using Quick Enrollment. Because we do not have data on who actu-
ally used Quick Enrollment, we attribute Quick Enrollment utilization to
those employees who have the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation.
Although this approach may generate some classiﬁcation error, the magni-
tude is likely to be quite small given that noneof the new hires from January
to June 2003 (before Quick Enrollment) who enrolled within their ﬁrst
month of employment elected the default asset allocation.8
8. Employees could have enrolled using Quick Enrollment and then subsequently changed
their asset allocation, which would also cause us to misclassify them. There are not likely to
be many such employees, given the frequency of our asset allocation observations.For all of the demographic groups listed in table 2.5, 401(k) participation
rates are substantially higher under Quick Enrollment (column 1 versus col-
umn 2). The absolute size of the participation increase is largest among
those who are ages thirty to ﬁfty (twenty-two percentage points) and earn-
ing more than $25,000 (twenty-six percentage points for those earning be-
tween $25,000 and $50,000, and thirty-two percentage points for those
earning more than $50,000). The proportional increase relative to pre-
Quick Enrollment participation rates is largest among blacks (385 percent),
those earning less than $25,000 (396 percent), and those men age thirty to
ﬁfty (292 percent). Across all demographic groups, over 75 percent of all
new-hire enrollments in the post-Quick Enrollment period occur through
Quick Enrollment. Quick Enrollment is especially popular among blacks
(83 percent) and those earning less than $25,000 (82 percent).
As discussed previously, Company A’s second Quick Enrollment imple-
mentation occurred from mid-June to early fall of 2004, in conjunction
with the new beneﬁts management Web-site rollout. The aggregate par-
ticipation impact of this extension of Quick Enrollment extension to all
nonparticipating employees is striking (ﬁg. 2.5). During a two-and-a-half
month period, the ﬁrm’s overall participation rate increased from 50 per-
cent to 60 percent, converting 20 percent of nonparticipants into partici-
pants. The eﬀects are similar for employees at both the main location and
at other locations, which is not surprising, given that in this intervention,
Quick Enrollment was made available to all nonparticipating employees,
regardless of location.
Table 2.6, which is analogous to table 2.5, examines the impact of Quick
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Fig. 2.5 401(k) participation rate (Company A, all employees at all locations)Table 2.6  Enrollment rates by employee characteristics: previously nonparticipating





Fraction Fraction  enrolling at  enrolling at QE 
enrolling at  any  enrolling at  any  nondefault  default 
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Age
  30 (%) 3.2 24.8 2.3 22.5
(5,103) (2,560) (2,560) (2,560)
30–50 (%) 3.0 26.5 1.7 24.7
(4,001) (1,871) (1,871) (1,871)
  50 (%) 5.1 17.7 1.1 16.6
(686) (367) (367) (367)
Gender
Female (%) 3.2 26.7 1.9 24.7
(7,092) (3,489) (3,489) (3,489)
Male (%) 3.3 20.2 2.1 18.1
(2,698) (1,309) (1,309) (1,309)
Race/Ethnicity
Black (%) 1.4 25.8 1.1 24.7
(2,369) (1,206) (1,206) (1,206)
White (%) 3.8 24.7 2.3 22.4
(7,246) (3,500) (3,500) (3,500)
Other/unknown (%) 5.7 21.7 2.2 19.6
(175) (92) (92) (92)
Compensation
  $25K (%) 1.7 17.5 1.6 15.9
(5,174) (2,451) (2,451) (2,451)
$25K–$50K (%) 4.5 30.4 2.2 28.2
(3,677) (1,806) (1,806) (1,806)
 $50K (%) 6.9 40.1 3.0 37.2
(939) (541) (541) (541)
Tenure
  2 years (%) 4.3 20.1 2.3 17.8
(4,053) (1,795) (1,795) (1,795)
2–5 years (%) 2.8 27.6 2.1 25.5
(2,507) (1,488) (1,488) (1,488)
  5 years (%) 2.2 27.9 1.5 26.4
(3,230) (1,515) (1,515) (1,515)
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample in column 1 is nonparticipants in June 2002 and
June 2003 (some individuals will be included in the sample twice if nonparticipants in both
2002 and 2003). The time frame over which enrollment is calculated is June through August
2002 and 2003 for column 1, and June through August 2004 for the remaining columns. The
sample in the remaining columns is nonparticipants in June 2004. Sample sizes for each cell
reported in parentheses.Enrollment on diﬀerent demographic groups. The ﬁrst column is the frac-
tion of previously nonparticipating employees who enrolled from June to
August of 2002 and 2003, prior to the adoption of Quick Enrollment.9 The
second column gives the fraction of nonparticipating employees enrolling
from June to August of 2003 during the second Quick Enrollment imple-
ment at Company A. This is disaggregated in the last two columns accord-
ing to whether the enrollment occurred through Quick Enrollment or not.
Again, we identify Quick Enrollment usage through the presence of the de-
fault asset allocation, which was elected by virtually none of the employees
who initiated plan participation prior to Quick Enrollment.
For all demographic groups, 401(k) enrollment rates are much higher
under Quick Enrollment, and the vast majority of enrollments (92 percent
across the entire population) are submitted through Quick Enrollment.
Absolute enrollment changes are largest for women (twenty-four percent-
age points), blacks (twenty-four percentage points), those earning more
than $25,000 (twenty-six percentage points for those earning between
$25,000 and $50,000, and thirty-three percentage points for those earning
more than $50,000), those aged thirty to ﬁfty (twenty-four percentage
points), and those who have been at the company more than ﬁve years
(twenty-six percentage points). Relative increases are largest for those be-
tween ages thirty and ﬁfty (823 percent), women (771 percent), blacks
(1,764 percent), those making less than $25,000 a year (935 percent), and
those who have been at the company for more than ﬁve years (1,200 per-
cent).
Given the evidence from previous research on the impact of defaults on
401(k) contribution rates and asset allocation, it is natural to ask how
Quick Enrollment, which can be viewed as a default that is opted into,
aﬀects these same outcomes. We have already noted that virtually no par-
ticipants enrolling in the 401(k) plan prior to Quick Enrollment selected
the default asset allocation (indeed, we identiﬁed Quick Enrollment usage
by whether the participant’s asset allocation matched the Quick Enroll-
ment default.) In contrast, 73 percent of newly hired participants (table
2.5) and 92 percent of new participants among existing employees (table
2.6) had the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation in the post-Quick
Enrollment period. Clearly, Quick Enrollment has an important eﬀect on
asset allocation outcomes.
Not surprisingly, Quick Enrollment has similar eﬀects on contribution
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9. Employees attending new-hire orientation at the main location in July and August 2003
were exposed to the Quick Enrollment intervention, thus attenuating the diﬀerence between
the Quick Enrollment population and the comparison population. These employees are a
small fraction of the total nonparticipating population, so their presence should not have a
signiﬁcant impact. Note also that employees who were nonparticipants in 2002 and again in
2003 are included in the sample more than once (and, if nonparticipants again in 2004, are
also in the sample for the last three columns of table 2.6).rates as well. Figure 2.6 shows the eﬀect of Quick Enrollment on the dis-
tribution of contribution rates for new employees thirty days after hire.10
As is typical in companies with an employer match, the modal contribu-
tion rate prior to Quick Enrollment is the employer match threshold of 6
percent; approximately 1 percent of new hires or 25 percent of newly hired
participants contribute at this rate. Under Quick Enrollment, however, the
modal contribution rate shifts to 2 percent, the Quick Enrollment default.
The fraction of employees contributing 2 percent increases more than
twenty-fold, from less than 1 percent of employees to 14 percent of em-
ployees. This represents an increase from 13 percent of participants to 75
percent of participants. We ﬁnd no evidence for the type of contribution
rate displacement that has been observed with automatic enrollment. In-
deed, the increase in the fraction of employees contributing 2 percent of
pay to the 401(k) plan at one month of tenure is approximately equal to the
Reducing the Complexity Costs of 401(k) Participation 73
Fig. 2.6 Contribution rate distribution of new hires enrolling within thirty days
(Company A, main location)
Note: Employees who did not enroll in the 401(k) plan within thirty days of hire are classiﬁed
as having a zero contribution rate and are included in calculating the fraction of new hires at
a given contribution rate, although we do not show the fraction of new hires with a zero con-
tribution rate in this ﬁgure.
10. We only observe contribution rates periodically, as described in section 2.1. In order to
approximate the contribution rate distribution thirty days after hire, we use the contribution
rate eﬀective in the data extract closest to the employees’ hire date and assign a zero contri-
bution rate to those who did not enroll within thirty days of hire. Because our closest contri-
bution rate observation is no more than eleven months after an employee’s hire, this approx-
imation should be very close to the actual distribution.one-month participation increase attributable to Quick Enrollment from
the probit regression in column 1 of table 2.1.
The second Quick Enrollment implementation, which occurred in con-
junction with the individual Web-site registrations, gave employees the op-
tion to choose any contribution rate in conjunction with the Quick Enroll-
ment default asset allocation. We would therefore expect less clustering at
any particular contribution rate. Figure 2.7 shows the distribution of con-
tribution rates for employees hired prior to June 2003, before Quick En-
rollment was adopted in any form at Company A, at two points in time.
The ﬁrst distribution is from June 1, 2004, three weeks before the registra-
tion period Quick Enrollment implementation began, and the second is
from September 1, 2004, which is our last data snapshot after this second
Quick Enrollment implementation. As in ﬁg. 2.6, the modal contribution
rate before Quick Enrollment is the match threshold of 6 percent. Under
Quick Enrollment, the fraction of employees with contribution rates be-
tween 1 percent and 6 percent increases noticeably, while there is little
eﬀect above 6 percent. Because Quick Enrollment participants are spread
across several contribution rates, the match threshold remains the modal
contribution rate.
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Fig. 2.7 Contribution rate distribution before and after individual meetings (Com-
pany A, all locations)
Note: Employees who had not enrolled in the 401(k) plan as of the snapshot date are classi-
ﬁed as having a zero contribution rate and are included in calculating the fraction of total em-
ployees at a given contribution rate, although we do not show the fraction of employees with
a zero contribution rate in this ﬁgure.2.3 Quick Enrollment and 401(k) Outcomes at Company B
We now turn to the Quick Enrollment implement at Company B which,
similar to the second implement at Company A, also targeted previously
hired nonparticipating employees.11As mentioned in section 2.1, this com-
pany executed a one-time mailing in late January 2003 to nonparticipating
employees. Those returning the reply card were enrolled in the 401(k) plan
at a 3 percent contribution rate, and all these contributions were invested
in a money market fund. Cards returned by the deadline were processed in
February 2003; late-reply cards were processed in May 2003.
In the case of Company B, our data identiﬁes the employees who were
mailed the Quick Enrollment cards. To measure the eﬀect of Quick En-
rollment, we need to identify what these recipients would have done in the
absence of Quick Enrollment. We use two control groups for this purpose.
The ﬁrst is employees who were not participating on February 1, 2002, a
year prior to Quick Enrollment. The second is the 16 percent of nonpar-
ticipants on February 1, 2003, who did not receive the Quick Enrollment
mailing. We are not certain why the company did not send these employ-
ees Quick Enrollment cards.12 Because selection into this group is unlikely
to be random, comparisons with the Quick Enrollment recipients must be
interpreted with caution.
Figure 2.8 shows the 401(k) participation time series for four groups of
Company B employees: all nonparticipating employees as of February 1,
2002; all Quick Enrollment recipients; nonparticipants as of February 1,
2003, who received the Quick Enrollment mailing; and nonparticipants as
of February 1, 2003, who did not receive the Quick Enrollment mailing.
The x-axis in ﬁg. 2.8, labeled “time since baseline,” is the number of months
since February 1, 2002, for nonparticipants as of that date, and number of
months since February 1, 2003, for the other three groups. Quick Enroll-
ment forms are ﬁrst processed between months 0 and 1 (February and
March of 2003); the ﬁnal processing of forms takes place between months
3 and 4 (May and June of 2003). Our time series for the February 2002 non-
participants begins at February 2002, when our contribution rate data be-
gin, and ends before the January 2003 Quick Enrollment mailing, to avoid
contamination with the Quick Enrollment mailing to some members of
this group.
The February 2002 nonparticipants show a slow and steady increase in
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11. The Quick Enrollment implementation at Company B used a yes/no reply card. The
vast majority (88 percent) of cards returned had an aﬃrmative election to participate in the
401(k) plan.
12. Seven percent of these individuals were hired in 2003, after the Quick Enrollment mail-
ing list was formed. Another 9 percent were participating at the time the list was compiled.
This leaves 84 percent unaccounted for.participation over time, with a participation rate of approximately 10 per-
cent after ten months. The February 2003 nonparticipants who did not
receive the Quick Enrollment mailing show a somewhat more sluggish
increase in participation, with 6 percent of this group having enrolled af-
ter ten months (note the possible selection bias for this latter group). In
contrast, the participation rate of Quick Enrollment recipients increases
markedly between months 0 and 1, and again between months 3 and 4,
which are exactly when the Quick Enrollment forms were processed. The
group of all Quick Enrollment recipients participates at a slightly higher
rate (about three percentage points) than February 2003 nonparticipants
who received Quick Enrollment. This diﬀerence, however, is completely ac-
counted for by the fact that some Quick Enrollment recipients enrolled on
their own in the lag between the time when the nonparticipant mailing list
was drawn up and when these individuals actually received the mailing
(that participation increase between time –1 and 0 for this group).
The patterns in ﬁg. 2.8 suggest that a plausible measure of Quick En-
rollment’s impact is the participation diﬀerence between the February
2002 nonparticipants and the February 2003 nonparticipants who re-
ceived Quick Enrollment. Averaging this diﬀerence over months 1 to 10
yields a ten-percentage point participation increase due to Quick Enroll-
ment. At month 4, a few weeks after the last forms were processed, this rep-
resents a near tripling of the participation rate. However, companywide
participation increased by only two percentage points from a baseline of 74
percent between February 1 and June 1 of 2003.
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Fig. 2.8 401(k) participation of initial nonparticipants over time (Company B)There are several potential reasons why the Quick Enrollment eﬀect was
smaller at Company B than at Company A. First, Company B’s initial par-
ticipation rate was much higher, so the potential scope for increasing par-
ticipation was smaller. Second, Company B’s Quick Enrollment options
may have been less attractive. Respondents were limited to only one con-
tribution rate (3 percent) rather than many, and the available asset alloca-
tion was a money market fund rather than a mix of a money market fund
and a balanced fund. Third, Company A had been using Quick Enrollment
for new hires for almost a year when they began targeting previously hired
nonparticipants, so there may have been a greater initial awareness and ac-
ceptance of Quick Enrollment. Finally, Company B’s Quick Enrollment
forms were distributed through a mailing, whereas Company A’s forms
were presented to employees in person.
Table 2.7, which is analogous to tables 2.5 and 2.6, reports enrollment
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Table 2.7.  Quick Enrollment utilization by employee characteristics: previously





Fraction Fraction  enrolling at  enrolling at QE 
enrolling at any  enrolling at any  nondefault  default 
allocation allocation allocation allocation
Age
  30 (%) 3.5 14.9 5.7 9.2
(824) (697) (697) (697)
30–50 (%) 4.9 19.3 3.8 15.5
(1,460) (1,385) (1,385) (1,385)
  50 (%) 2.9 18.2 5.6 12.6
(275) (302) (302) (302)
Gender
Female (%) 4.4 16.7 4.7 12.0
(611) (491) (491) (491)
Male (%) 4.2 18.2 4.5 13.6
(1,948) (1,893) (1,893) (1,893)
Tenure
  2 years (%) 6.8 23.0 7.4 15.6
(1,341) (979) (979) (979)
2–5 years (%) 1.9 18.2 3.5 14.7
(755) (898) (898) (898)
  5 years (%) 0.6 7.5 1.2 6.3
(463) (507) (507) (507)
Source: Authors’ calculations. The sample in column 1 is nonparticipants in February 2002.
The sample in the remaining columns is nonparticipants in February 2003. The time frame
over which enrollment is calculated is February through May of 2002 for column 1, and Feb-
ruary through May of 2003 for the remaining columns. Sample sizes for each cell reported in
parentheses.rates for various demographic groups at Company B. Enrollees under the
Quick Enrollment regime are compared to employees who enrolled a year
prior. As in table 2.5 and 2.6, we attribute Quick Enrollment utilization to
those employees with the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation. Of
Company B employees who enrolled between January 1, 2002, and Febru-
ary 18, 2003, (just prior to the initial Quick Enrollment processing), only
5.9 percent had the Quick Enrollment default asset allocation at the end of
their initial participation year. In contrast, 75 percent of those enrolling
between February and May 2003 chose the Quick Enrollment default asset
allocation.
As in Company A, we ﬁnd that enrollment rates are higher under Quick
Enrollment for all demographic groups at Company B and that the major-
ity of enrollees use Quick Enrollment rather than a traditional enrollment
channel. The largest absolute changes are among those over age thirty
(fourteen percentage points for those between ages thirty and ﬁfty, and ﬁf-
teen percentage points for those over age ﬁfty) and those who have less
than ﬁve years of tenure (sixteen percentage points). The largest relative
changes are among those over age ﬁfty (434 percent) and those with more
than ﬁve years of tenure (1,050 percent).
Figure 2.9shows the month 4 contribution rate distribution at Company
B for the four employee groups in ﬁg. 2.8. We do not show employees with
a zero contribution rate, in order to highlight the diﬀerences across the
other contribution rates. As in Company A, the impact of Quick Enroll-
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Fig. 2.9 Distribution of 401(k) contribution rates for new participants
(Company B)ment on contribution rates is readily apparent. Almost none of the em-
ployees who did not receive Quick Enrollment chose a 3 percent contribu-
tion rate. Instead, most enrollees chose rates at or above the 6 percent
match threshold. In contrast, participants who received the Quick Enroll-
ment mailing are largely enrolled at the 3 percent default contribution rate.
In Company B we do ﬁnd some evidence of contribution rate displace-
ment. The 12 percent fraction of Quick Enrollment recipients at the de-
fault contribution rate exceeds the 10 percent impact of Quick Enrollment
on participation. Quick Enrollment recipients at the 3 percent contribu-
tion rate thus appear to be composed both of employees brought into the
plan because of Quick Enrollment and of employees who would have en-
rolled at a diﬀerent—and likely higher—contribution rate in the absence
of Quick Enrollment. The magnitude of the contribution rate displace-
ment is similar to that estimated for automatic enrollment (Madrian and
Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2004).
2.4 Conclusions
Madrian and Shea (2001), Iyengar and Jiang (2003), and Iyengar et al.
(2004) have argued that the complexity of the 401(k) savings decision dis-
courages employees from timely enrollment, even when they prefer partic-
ipation to nonparticipation. Quick Enrollment is a low-cost manipulation
that reduces this complexity by allowing employees to enroll at a default
contribution rate and asset allocation preselected by the employer. We ﬁnd
that Quick Enrollment tripled participation among new hires relative to a
standard enrollment mechanism in which employees must actively select
both a contribution rate and an asset allocation. When Quick Enrollment
was made available to previously hired employees who were not partici-
pating in their 401(k) plan, 10 percent to 20 percent of these nonpartici-
pants enrolled in the plan.
Quick Enrollment has a much smaller participation eﬀect than auto-
matic enrollment, which typically induces near-universal participation.
But relative to automatic enrollment, Quick Enrollment has the beneﬁt
of protecting employers from litigation if they pick defaults with equity
exposure, since Quick Enrollment is an opt-in mechanism. Like auto-
matic enrollment, Quick Enrollment causes clustering of enrollees at the
employer-selected contribution rate and asset allocation. Those at the
Quick Enrollment defaults include not only employees who would not have
enrolled without Quick Enrollment, but also employees who would have
otherwise enrolled with other elections. It is unlikely that this herding is
ﬁrst-best for employees. However, Quick Enrollment induces less herding
than automatic enrollment.
The active decision approach to 401(k) participation—an alternative
401(k) enrollment mechanism studied by Choi et al. (2005)—requires em-
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deadline without any employer guidance. The active decision participation
eﬀect lies well above the Quick Enrollment eﬀect and below the automatic
enrollment eﬀect. The active decision approach’s advantage is that there is
no clustering of savings outcomes; the contribution rate distribution three
months after hire under active decision is indistinguishable from the con-
tribution rate distribution three yearsafter hire under a standard opt-in en-
rollment regime. On the other hand, active decision forces employees to
struggle with a diﬃcult decision in a domain where they may have little ex-
pertise. A mechanism that gives employees a hard deadline with a Quick
Enrollment option that has a small number of choices may be a fruitful hy-
brid approach.13
Another issue that should attract additional study is the optimal num-
berof Quick Enrollment options. Quick Enrollment’s primary goal is to in-
crease 401(k) participation by reducing the complexity of enrolling in the
401(k) plan. However, employees who do not like the Quick Enrollment de-
fault will be unlikely to use it to enroll. Increasing the number of Quick En-
rollment options makes Quick Enrollment attractive to a greater number
of employees but also increases its complexity. An extremely large number
of prebundled savings options would defeat the purpose of Quick Enroll-
ment. However, increasing the number of options from one to two is un-
likely to signiﬁcantly increase Quick Enrollment’s complexity.
Recent psychology research provides a framework for thinking about
these issues. There are two potential sources of complexity in this 401(k)
decision: choosing an appropriate contribution rate and choosing an ap-
propriate asset allocation. Expanding the array of Quick Enrollment op-
tions could involve increasing either the number of contribution rate
options (as in Company A’s second Quick Enrollment implementation for
nonparticipating employees), the number of asset allocation options, or
both. One key diﬀerence between contribution rates and asset allocationsis
the extent to which the available options are easily comparable. Diﬀerent
contribution rates are alignable outcomes—they can be easily ordered
from low to high—and this makes the diﬀerent possible choices easier to
compare (Gourville and Soman 2005). In contrast, diﬀerent asset alloca-
tions are nonalignable outcomes: they vary in noncomparable dimensions
like expected return, currency risk, inﬂation risk, business cycle risk, man-
agement fees, and so forth.
Gourville and Soman (2005) report results from brand choice experi-
ments showing that increasing a brand’s alignable options increases the
probability that consumers purchase from that brand, whereas increasing
80 James J. Choi, David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian
13. This might include giving employees the option of explicitly stating that they would
rather make their own elections using the standard channels; there is no need to restrict so-
phisticated employees who have strong preferences about their retirement savings.nonalignable options decreases purchase probability. Other papers that
look only at the impact of increasing nonalignable options ﬁnd that more
options increase the likelihood of not choosing anything (Dhar and Nowlis
1999; Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Most importantly for this paper’s results,
Iyengar and Jiang (2003) and Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) ﬁnd a
negative relationship between the number of funds in a 401(k) investment
menu and 401(k) participation rates. This result holds even among ﬁrms
with a relatively low number of funds.
In summary, the literature on the psychology of consumer choice sug-
gests that increasing the number of alignable options (i.e., savings rates),
will lead to increased Quick Enrollment utilization, whereas increasing the
number of nonalignable options (i.e., asset allocation options), will lead to
reduced Quick Enrollment utilization. The Quick Enrollment implemen-
tation for nonparticipating employees at Company A does not provide a
direct test of this conjecture, as there was no variation in the number of
contribution rate or asset allocation options. But it is worth noting that
Quick Enrollment was very eﬀective in increasing participation, even when
employees were able to choose from the full array of (alignable) contribu-
tion rates. Further research on this front, where both the number of con-
tribution rates and the number of asset allocation options were varied,
would be informative for both the optimal design of Quick Enrollment-like
interventions and for the literature on the psychology of choice more gen-
erally.
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There is nothing like a powerful empirical randomized study to help clean
old theories out of the attic and replace them with fresher and empirically
more compelling ones. With this randomized study of the Quick Enroll-
ment plan, the team of Choi, Laibson, and Madrian have added to their
remarkable series of experiments on how 401(k) plan structures aﬀect sav-
ing behavior. The experiment provides insights for two theoretical areas:
the economics of savings and the economics of choice. I’ll consider each in
turn.
In the conventional model of lifecycle saving, individual agents maxi-
mize utility over their lifespan by smoothing consumption—or more pre-
cisely, by ensuring that all appropriate Euler-equation conditions are
satisﬁed. Thus saving is simply a residual between earnings and optimally
chosen consumption. In a series of papers, Madrian and colleagues have
forced us to think quite diﬀerently about savings in optimizing models.
First, in Madrian and Shea (2001), we found that the default matters; when
new employees must opt out of a 401(k) saving plan, rather than having to
opt into a 401(k) plan, they are far more likely to save more, at least within
the 401(k). The result does not provide very strong support for our con-
ventional models of saving: if something as trivial as a default rule could
have a long-term impact on saving and hence on consumption, then we
must conclude that these marginal savers aren’t doing a very good job of
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